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ABSTRACT 
Many researchers have felt uncomfortable with the precision of  degrees of  belief 
that seems to be demanded by the subjective Bayesian treatment of  uncertainty. 
Various responses have been suggested. The most common one has been to 
incorporate higher order probabilities in systems that reason in beliefs. These 
probabilities concern statements of  first-order probability. Thus a first-order 
probability (e.g., the probability of  heads on the next toss of  this coin is 1/2) is the 
subject of  a second-order probability; for example, the probability is .9 that the 
probability of  heads on the next toss of  this coin is 1/2. This approach is explored 
and is found to be epistemologically wanting, although there are important 
intuitions about beliefs that are captured by it. Furthermore, this approach may, in 
some circumstances, be computationally attractive. We also briefly explore a 
number c f other approaches, including taking probabilities to be intervals and 
construing probability values as fuzzy sets. 
KEYWORDS: higher-order probability, subjective probability, interval 
probability, fuzzy  probabil ity 
BACKGROUND 
Why are we interested in measures of uncertainty? There are several nswers. 
The first has to do with their use in decision theory. Most writers accept the 
principle of maximizing expected utility, when this principle can be applied. 
Because there is vagueness involved in both measuring uncertainty and 
measuring utility, this principle cannot always be followed in detail except in the 
most ideal circumstances. But even if uncertainty is measured by intervals, say, 
we can at least avoid choosing an act whose upper bound on expected utility is 
less than the lower bound offered by some alternative act. All this is to say that 
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one use of uncertainty is in calculating expectations, asbest we can, in order to 
rank alternatives. 
We may also consider purely epistemic uncertainty. Much, if not all, of what 
we know is in some sense and degree "uncertain." Commonsense inference, 
which we try to capture in circumscription or default logics, yields re ults that 
are not certain but only highly plausible. To talk of models of the world rather 
than knowledge of the world does not avoid the problem of uncertainty: We want 
to know to what extent we can depend on the model to tell us the truth. The 
answer is clearly that we cannot be sure, but we can distinguish between more 
and less dependable models. Not only do we need to admit that knowledge is 
uncertain; we also need to make some qualitative distinctions. There is a 
difference between what we know of the structure of a complicated molecule 
(the degree to which our model of it is dependable) and what we know of the 
movements of the planets (the dependability of our model of the solar system). 
We would like to be able to represent this difference in both human and 
artificial systems. One important reason to do so is that contrary evidence can 
quickly undermine a model or theory that is very uncertain, while in the case of a 
highly certain model or theory it is the contrary evidence itself (or its source) that 
is called into question in case of conflict. 
Finally, there is what might be called doxastic uncertainty. Our attitude 
toward many propositions is not that we know them, or even simply believe 
them with complete confidence, but that we believe them to a certain degree: 
Under the right circumstances or at the right odds, we would bet against them. If  
we are interested in modeling human intelligent systems, it is necessary for us to 
capture this phenomenon. And if we can find an appropriate theory of human 
degrees of belief, we could perhaps apply it in machine intelligence. Or, 
alternatively, if we can formulate a good theory of partial commitment in the 
artificial domain, we might take that theory normatively as an ideal toward 
which we humans hould strive. 
So we have three kinds of uncertainty--practical, epistemic, and doxastic. 
They may not be unrelated; in fact, we hope they are related, and even that they 
come to the same thing. 
There are two contrasts we should also mention explicitly before we proceed. 
There is the distinction between objective and subjective measures of 
uncertainty, and there is a distinction between ormative and descriptive uses of 
uncertainty measures. 
Many writers, particularly of the Bayesian persuasion, refer to "subjective" 
probability without always really meaning it. (I take a "Bayesian" to be 
someone primarily concerned with doxastic uncertainty, who believes that all 
modification of uncertainty in response to new evidence should take place by 
Bayes' theorem--i.e., conditionalization.) But there is room for ambiguity here. 
We may mean merely that probability or uncertainty in this sense is relativized to 
a subject, as opposed to being inherent in nature or determined by the laws of 
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physics. This probability may be construed as an objective logical relation, as 
Keynes [1], Carnap [2], and perhaps Jaynes [3] thought of it. 
We may thus distinguish between logical probability and "subjective" 
probability that is not constrained by logical relations between aproposition and 
the total evidence concerning it that is available to the agent. The latter is the 
sense of "subjective" used by Savage [4] and de Finetti [5]. For them, 
probability is subjective in the strong sense that there is no disputing the 
probability that an individual assigns to any single proposition. 
There is nevertheless an objective and normative element even in this 
subjective approach. The collection of probabilities that he individual assigns to 
any finite field of sets must satisfy the axioms of probability. This is an objective 
constraint--it is the same for all individuals. And it is normative--it is a 
constraint that the degrees of belief held by individuals ought o satisfy, because 
people ought to be rational. Nevertheless, I construe the position characterized 
by only these constraints as subjective, because, given any proposition, any 
degree of belief in that proposition is as good, formally, as any other, 
regardless of the available vidence. I also construe it as descriptive, since the 
only source of these arbitrary probabilities i the actual opinion of an individual. 
Any set of probabilities conforming to the calculus may describe the opinions of 
a rational subject. 
Probabilities may also be construed as objective. There are two ways in 
which probabilities may be objective. First, they may be objective because they 
are determined by the objective (actual, factual) state of the world. The 
probabilities characteristic of gambling apparatus or the statistical probabilities 
we determine by sampling large homogeneous populations are probabilities of 
this sort. If the world were different, they could have different values; they 
reflect he way the world is, rather than our beliefs about he world. 
An alternative way in which probabilities can be objective is that they can be 
determined by a logical relation between a proposition and a body of evidence. 
The probability of a proposition isdetermined by the body of evidence relative to 
which its probability is evaluated. These probabilities are sometimes miscalled 
"subjective" because they are relativized to the body of evidence in the 
possession of a knowing subject. Even if no two people have th same body of 
evidence, so that no two people assign the same probability to the proposition in 
question, probability can be objective: The probability assigned to a proposition 
can be a logical function of the evidence bearing on it. Probability may be 
construed as an objective logical function. 
Finally, although the subjective view embodies a normative lement, it is 
possible to make the normative lement stronger. One can say that the agent, 
under his particular evidential circumstances, ought o assign a probability (and 
ought to have a corresponding degree of belief) of such and such. This was the 
view of Keynes and of Carnap and his followers; degree of confirmation, or 
epistemic probability, represented a logical relation between a hypothesis and 
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given evidence bearing on it, which represented exactly the degree of belief that 
a rational agent would have in that hypothesis, given that he had just that 
evidence. 
The point of this discussion of fine philosophical points is that they have a 
considerable bearing on the interest in and functions of nonstandard measures of 
uncertainty. There has come to be a fair amount of interest in such measures in 
AI. Among the suggestions have been interval-valued probabilities, higher order 
probabilities, belief functions, possibility theory, and various ad hoc measures 
of uncertainty. I hope to contribute to the clarification of the alternatives in what 
follows and to point out some interesting relations among them. 
NONSTANDARD VIEWS 
There are a number of extremely nonstandard measures of uncertainty. The 
certainty factors of MYCIN (Shortliffe [6]) provide an example. However useful 
such measures may be in special situations, they are not appropriate for the 
general measurement of degrees of certainty. The reason is quite straightfor- 
ward. One use of measures of uncertainty, as remarked, is as an aid in decision 
making. In general terms, one wants to weight he utility of a possible outcome 
by its degree of certainty. From this it quickly follows that the sum of the 
weights assigned to a pair of exhaustive and exclusive alternatives must be 1.0 
and that in general the weights must be additive. (The argument is the famous 
"Dutch book" theorem established independently by de Finetti [5] and F. P. 
Ramsey [7].) The problem with certainty factors is not their range ( -  I to + 1), 
since renormalization could be taken as part of the decision rule, but the failure 
of additivity. 
Some writers (de Finetti, for example) draw the conclusion from the Dutch 
book theorem that uncertainties must be probabilities. A weaker conclusion 
would be that measures of uncertainty should not conflict with probabilities. 
Classical probabilities hould be a special case. This is true of the views we 
consider below. (For example, a natural constraint on i terval measures of 
uncertainty would bethat there exists a classical probability function consistent 
with the intervals.) A still weaker conclusion would be that the uncertainties we 
need for decision making are different from the epistemic and doxastic 
uncertainties we use for other purposes. For a variety of reasons, not the least of 
which is intellectual economy, we should be very reluctant o accept this 
conclusion. 
BAYESIANS 
Most writers of the Bayesian persuasion understand probability to be 
subjective. In general (Peter Cheeseman [8] is an exception), they take it to be 
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primarily descriptive. There is, of course, the minor normative element I
mentioned earlier--one's degrees of belief ought to satisfy the axioms of the 
probability calculus, but beyond that they simply are what they are. Finally, the 
central function of probability is doxastic; probability is concerned with degrees 
of belief. Of course, since beliefs are subject o the constraints of the probability 
calculus (even on the descriptive view), the numbers will serve for computing 
expectations and thus for decision making. 
From this point of view--the general subjectivistic point of view--there is no 
need for anything but classical subjective probability. It is quite true that many 
people feel that there are further distinctions to be made. Even Jimmie Savage 
[4] confessed that he felt that there were probabilities about which he "felt more 
sure" than others. Savage's way of accounting for this was to distinguish these 
insecure probabilities as the ones that he would be most likely to give up were he 
to find himself somehow in violation of the probability calculus. 
The distinction, for Savage, between secure and insecure probabilities was 
methodological: The agent's doxastic state is completely characterized by a 
classical point-valued probability function defined over his whole universe of 
possibilities. Of course we cannot measure all these probabilities imultane- 
ously, so we cannot be sure that some contradiction to the probability calculus 
does not exist. If it does, some probabilities will have to be changed while others 
are preserved. The distinction between degrees of belief of which we feel more 
confident and degrees of belief of which we feel less confident is a reflection of 
which degrees of belief we will be least ready to change on the basis of 
discovered conflict with the probability calculus. 
It is interesting to compare this treatment of probabilistic insecurity with Judea 
Pearl's treatment [9]. According to Pearl, the insecurity we feel concerning 
some probability assignments reflects the fact that some not unlikely contingency 
would alter that probability. If you also take account of the various contingen- 
cies, then, of course, the value 0.53 assigned to win in his example is not an 
"expectation" but a simple, ordinary, probability. The agent, claiming that he is 
unsure of the probability of win despite the fact that he is sure of the conditional 
probabilities of win given various eventualities and sure of the probabilities of 
each of the eventualities, is simply being inconsistent. The principle of total 
probability assures that the sum of all the products enumerated by Pearl is 
exactly the probability of win. 
That does not explain the feeling of insecurity the agent may have about 
assigning a probability of .53 to win. But Pearl provides us with both an 
explanation of this feeling and a measure of it, all within a classical framework. 
Just as Savage took insecurity to be a symptom of willingness to give up a 
probability value in response to an inconsistency with the calculus, so Pearl takes 
insecurity to be a symptom of willingness to change a probability in the face of 
one of a small group of specific contingencies. If we look on probability as a 
random quantity, then we may compute its variance as well as its expectation 
under a set of contingencies whose probabilities we know. A large variance 
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reflects uncertainty. He is quite right: If we are going to be Bayesians, we have 
no need of higher order probabilities, interval-valued probabilities, belief 
functions, or any such mechanisms to explain the intuitive distinctions we feel 
between one probability and another. 
So if we are going to be Bayesians, where do we fit on the map of uses and 
kinds of uncertainty with which I began? The central feature of probability on 
this view is its subjectivity. One may try to avoid that by referring to the beliefs 
of a rational agent as a litmus for testing correct probability judgments. But this 
can help us only when we have got hold of the right epistemic principles to 
determine what the rational agent would believe. Lacking this, we have only a 
Shavian conjugation: ! am rational; you are gullible; he or she is nuttier than a 
fruitcake. 
Given that probability is subjective in this sense, it can function doxastically; 
it may be just right for characterizing idealized oxastic states. But it is quite 
worthless for epistemic purposes. There is no "correct" probability, even given 
the evidence. There is no adjudicating disagreements about probability even 
when all the evidence is shared (though getting more evidence will, in general, 
reduce the degree of disagreement). It is essentially a descriptive view. In 
decision theory it appears to function reasonably well, but this is a reflection of 
the fact that in many situations people agree reasonably well about probabilities. 
It might be thought hat the classical subjective Bayesian theory had more to 
do with decision making than this, in view of the behavioristic attitude it has 
toward the measurement of belief. It works the other way. It is dispositions to 
decide that give operational content to the attribution of degrees of belief, and 
the principle of maximizing expected utility is built into this procedure. The 
decision theory is input, not output. 
Our discomfort with exact probabilities, our inclination to want an interval or 
a higher order distribution, or another measure of uncertainty altogether, may 
actually be a discomfort with Bayesianism itself. 
HIGHER ORDER PROBABILITY 
A number of writers who feel the artificiality of being forced to represent their 
beliefs by an exact probability distribution have suggested that a better 
representation would be provided by taking account of "higher order" or 
"second-order" probabilities. This approach comes in two flavors, according as 
the higher and lower probabilities are all given the same interpretation or 
different interpretations. 
Thus ! may assign a first-order probability of .4 to the occurrence of heads on 
the next toss of this coin, but I may lack confidence in my assignment. I might 
say that the probability is between .3 and .5. I might say that the probability is 
only .7 that the probability is .4. Or better yet, I might say that the probability is 
distributed normally with a mean of .4 and a variance of .01. (This is not the 
Higher Order Probabilities and Intervals 201 
same as Pearl's treatment; I am not considering some small set of contingencies 
but all possibilities.) 
Suppose that it is the same (subjective?) sort of probability that is involved at 
both levels. In the first place it is immediately clear that this second-order 
approach will give us no help regarding the measurement problem: Where 
before we had difficully measuring our degree of belief in the statement S, we 
now have many more difficulties measuring the parameters ofour distribution of 
belief in S. 
We find again that we have not nly not departed from the classical Bayesian 
picture, but we have also multiplied our problems. If we are unsure of the value 
of the probability of a head on the next toss, how can we be sure of the 
probabilities of all the possible values of the parameters that represent the bias of 
the coin? 
Furthermore, with this representation, what we thought of as an uncertain 
probability becomes merely the marginal density of a two-dimensional distribu- 
tion. But then there is an exact probability for anything in either dimension; to 
get it, you simply integrate the two-dimensional probability density. Another 
term for what you get is "expectation"; but the principle of total probability, 
generalized, requires that the marginal density at a point d be the expected value 
of the two-dimensional density over all possible values of the second variable 
consistent with d. 
The effort to understand first-order probabilities in terms of second-order 
probabilities, if the probabilities are all given the same interpretation, is doomed 
to failure. 
PROBABILITIES OF TWO SORTS 
Higher order probabilities, if they are given a different interpretation from 
that given to first-order probabilities, make more sense. The most natural view, 
discussed by Brian Skyrms in Casual Necessity [10], is that first-order 
probabilities represent propensities or frequencies--objective facts about the 
word--and second-order p obabilities represent degrees of belief. I may have a 
certain degree of belief that the propensity of this die to land five in the long run 
is .3. The degree of belief (the second-order probability) and the long-run 
relative frequency (the first-order probability) are clearly distinct. 
An example of how these two orders of probability are used may help. 
Suppose I have to make adecision that depends on whether or not the tenth toss 
of the die under consideration yields a five. If I knew the bias of the die, I would 
take the corresponding quantity (say the long-run frequency of fives) to 
determine my degree Of belief in a five on the tenth toss. 
But I am really unsure of the bias. Thus I cannot (so I say) pick a point on a 
unit line to represent the probability of a five on the tenth toss. With the help ofa 
second-order p obability PP, however, I can (so I say) characterize my belief 
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regarding five on the tenth toss. All I need to do is to take account of my 
distribution of belief regarding bias. This gives Figure 1, supposing that my 
belief about he bias for fives can be r presented by a distribution that is roughly 
normal with a mean o f .  16 and a variance of .0009. 
The subjectively expected value of the objective frequency of fives on which 
we want to base our belief in a five on the tenth toss is thus 0.16. Note that 
despite the fact that there are frequencies underlying the belief concerning the 
tenth toss, that degree of belief is itself subjective. The frequency of fives on the 
tenth toss is exactly 1 or exactly 0. 
More generally, let us speak of possible worlds (points in a frame of 
discernment, if you prefer). Let us classify them according to the outcome of the 
tenth toss of a die. Let the Pi represent the propensities of the die in question to 
yield any of the six possible outcomes. Thus each Pi is a sextuple of real 
numbers adding up to 1; Pn = (1/6, 1/6, 1/6, 1/6, 1/6, 1/6 / represents the 
behavior of a normal die, for example. The second-order p obability represents 
our distribution of belief over the various possibilities--quite possibly infinite-- 
of loading. Let us represent the second-order distribution by PP(Pi). Thus our 
degree of belief in the normality of the die in question might be 1/2: PP(P,,) = 
1/2. 
Of course, instead of considering a discrete distribution of biases, we may 
consider a continuous distribution in six-space. So the most straightforward 
procedure is to represent our beliefs by a two-dimensional figure, as in Figure 2. 
Suppose we have to choose between two actions: for example, to bet at even 
money on the occurrence of a five on the tenth roll or to abstain from betting. 
The natural computational procedure would be to compute the expected utility 
(gain given the outcome times propensity of the outcome) of the alternative acts 
under each hypothesis concerning bias and then weight these expectations 
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according to our opinions about the bias. Despite the fact that the probabilities 
appear to be so different, we still can construct a product space, and a joint 
distribution over it, and evaluate the courses of action over that product space. Is 
this just an artifact? Are we just mixing oil and water and calling it mayonnaise? 
A careful look at the example shows that we are not. What determines the 
utility of our act is not the relative frequency of fives in general, but the relative 
frequency of fives on the tenth roll--that is, whether there is one or not. The Pi's 
give the long-run frequency or propensity of the die to yield twos. There are 
many circumstances under which a distribution such as that given by one of the 
Pi would determine the utility of an action that depended on the outcome in 
question. There are also many circumstances under which it would not: If the 
throw has occurred and we know the outcome; if the throw is to be performed 
by an expert who can control the outcome; and so on. The utility of an action 
under the assumption of a particular loading hypothesis will, under ordinary 
circumstances, be determined by the sextuple mbodied in that hypothesis. But 
this is just an instance of what is traditionally called "direct inference" from a 
statistical distribution to a degree of belief. (The principle of "direct inference" 
is not easy to formulate; see Kyburg [11] and the references therein, for 
example.) The conditions under which direct inference is appropriate are just 
those under which it is appropriate to weight the possible outcomes of the tenth 
toss by the six numbers given by Pi. 
To choose among actions whose outcomes depend on specific events requires 
beliefs; the beliefs may depend on statistical knowledge. The second-order 
probabilities PP(Pi) represent an allocation of our beliefs among the possibili- 
ties indexed by i. These may (or may not) in turn be based on some form of 
statistical knowledge, but the source of probabilities i irrelevant to the question 
of whether it makes sense to combine them with the probabilities of bias in a 
joint distribution. For a decision problem it clearly does make sense to combine 
them. 
The upshot is that even when we think we are using different kinds of 
probability as our first- and second-order p obabilities, the differences make no 
difference in the decision situation. 
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With respect to the doxastic and epistemic functions of uncertainty measure- 
ment, we are also no better off than we were before; in both cases we need to 
combine the first- and higher order probabilities, and when we have done so we 
are left with a single classical probability that, although it has objective 
elements, is essentially subjective and descriptive. We have not, by turning to 
higher order probabilities, assuaged our discomfort with the subjective Bayesian 
approach or our doubts about the feasibility of the logical approach. 
There is yet another way of construing higher order probabilities. This 
approach is pursued by Zoltan Domotor [12] and be Chaim Gaifmann [13]. It is 
also discussed by Skyrms. In this view, all probabilities are construed as degrees 
of belief, but they are different functions, since they concern the degrees of 
belief of different agents. This comes out most clearly in the paper by Domotor 
[12]. Thus I may have a degree of belief concerning your degree of belief 
concerning my degree of belief that your degree of belief in five on the sixth toss 
is 1/3. One can construct complex and interesting structures in this way, but it is 
not clear that in ordinary (nonpsychological) pplications of probability we need 
these structures. 
The interest of such approaches goes far beyond the kind of amateur 
psychology that might be associated with the project of representing a person's 
beliefs. There is the challenge of providing a representation f ideal beliefs-- 
that is, the beliefs of a person who has infinite insight and self-understanding but
who is otherwise in a situation like that in which we find ourselves. In the case of 
a single individual, the point is not to deny that the individual's "degree of belief 
in S" is just the expected value of his degree of belief in S weighted by his 
attitude toward the correctness ofhis beliefs about his beliefs. It is to explore the 
structure that lies between. Baroque? Yes. Useful? Probably not. Intelligible? 
Yes. Furthermore, it yields a structure that is alleged to have significant intrinsic 
interest. 
Domotor's ystematic investigations concern an even richer domain. He is 
concerned to provide a framework in which we can express uch complexities as 
the classical "He believes that she believes that they doubt that his uncle believes 
that he himself doubts that • • . . "  Furthermore, the object is not merely to be 
able to express these complexities but also to be able to provide a normative 
standard against which to judge the rationality of each of these beliefs. We are 
thus concerned with a wonderfully complicated omain, in which both 
descriptive and ormative lements may be found. Could a philosopher ask for 
more? 
Perhaps not, if our concern is human psychology and human reason. These 
approaches topartial belief may therefore constitute important contributions toa 
certain descriptive (and normative) part of phychology or philosophy. Neverthe- 
less, from the point of view of an individual agent (human or otherwise) facing a 
specific hoice or a specific distribution of belief among alternatives, the upshot 
of the more complex approach is just the set of expectation values that we have 
already taken account of at a lower level. 
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INTERVALS 
One long-standing effort to deal with the discomfort of exact subjective 
probabilities has been the proposal to take them as intervals rather than as real 
numbers. Such efforts date back to 1959 (Kyburg [14] and Smith [15]). A 
modern version is given by Shafer's Mathematical Theory f Evidence [16]. A 
proposition, in a given state of belief, is characterized by the value of a belief 
function and by the value of a plausibility function. The belief and plausibility 
functions are essentially upper and lower probabilities; they correspond exactly 
to the upper and lower probabilities of Dempster [ 17]. 
As Savage pointed out long ago, the mere use of intervals is no solution to ur 
discomfort over assigning real-valued probabilities to propositions. Instead of 
assigning one subjective real number to every proposition, we must assign two. 
That must be at least twice as hard. Actually, things are exponentially worse, 
since we must assign numbers to each subset of the set of atoms of our algebra, 
since the atoms of the algebra correspond to state descriptions or possible 
worlds, and every distinct subset of them corresponds to a distinct proposition 
that may have its own interval assigned to it. 
Recall that the basic Bayesian theory is doxastic; that is, it is concerned 
primarily with degrees of belief and only secondarily or not at all with epistemic 
questions. It is subjective: There is no right and wrong about any individual 
assignment of probability--they come out of the air. And it is descriptive rather 
than normative. The theory describes the distribution of beliefs of an agent 
whose beliefs conform to the probability calculus. 
On all three scores, interval theory is worse off. It just is not at all clear how 
an interval is supposed to represent a belief. If there are degrees of belief, they 
must be points rather than intervals. Smith, in 1965 [15], tried to characterize 
belief concerning S by means of the greatest odds you would offer a bettor 
betting on S and the greatest odds you would offer against S. You obtain an 
interval this way, but the odds tend to reflect the absolute magnitude of the stake 
and other irrelevant factors. Subjectively, just as Savage said, if it is hard to 
settle on one number to characterize your belief in S, it must be harder to settle 
on two numbers. Descriptively we may have gained a bit, but that is the only 
gain, and it is purchased at high cost. 
OBJECTIVE INTERVALS 
But there are other reasons for wanting a theory of uncertainty, and other 
characteristics that such a theory might have. Consider objectivity, for example. 
If probability intervals are determined on objective grounds, there is no problem 
of "choosing" end points of intervals as opposed to choosing subjective 
probabilities directly. It may be unclear how intervals "describe" beliefs, but it 
is quite clear how intervals provide anormative theory: To the extent that beliefs 
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can be characterized by real numbers, they ought to satisfy the interval bounds. 
Or perhaps beliefs themselves should be characterized by intervals; then they 
ought to be subintervals of the corresponding probability intervals. Finally, how 
do objective intervals answer the needs of the three functions for which we want 
measures of uncertainty? 
Not as well as real-valued probabilities, of course. The principle of 
maximizing expected utility is a complete and final solution to the problem of 
decision, if you have the probabilities and utilities to feed into it. Probability 
intervals give you expectation i tervals, and while you do get some guidance 
(note that it is objective and normative), it may need supplementation. We can 
say that you should not choose an alternative whose maximum expected utility is 
less than the minimum expected utility of some other alternative. But after 
applying this rule, you may still have a lot of alternatives, characterized by 
different intervals of expected utility. Thus the principle of maximizing expected 
utility (or of avoiding dominated alternatives) may need to be supplemented, for 
example, by a principle of minimizing maximum expected loss. 
Utilities also may best be construed as intervals, in which case there is no loss 
to decision theory in also considering probabilities to be intervals. 
Epistemically, we are just as well off as we are with classical probabilities; the 
lower end of a probability interval is as good a guide to full belief as a classical 
probability. And if it can be regarded as objective, it is better. A lot hinges on 
this objectivity. 
An intuition that suggests the possibility of having objective grounds for 
interval probabilities i the following: It is quite something else than insecurity 
that interval probabilities attempt to capture. If we think of the justification of 
degrees of belief, we are typically led to statistical knowledge. But our statistical 
knowledge is never precise. Suppose you get a lot of statistics on a certain class 
of objects. These statistics can--unless induction is a hoax--justify the 
acceptance of a statistical hypothesis. However, they cannot justify the 
acceptance of an exact hypothesis; they can only justify something like an 
interval hypothesis. Thus we can be justified in believing that between 30% and 
40% of the A's are B's, but not that exactly 35% of the A's are B's. 
We can, at least some of the time, base our probabilities on ur knowledge of 
frequencies; ince our knowledge of frequencies can be only approximate, the 
probabilities we base on this knowledge can be only approximate, that is, 
interval-valued. However, our statistical knowledge can be objective (Kyburg 
[181). 
This last claim is certainly arguable. It is a claim in the foundations and 
philosophy of statistics, and not an appropriate one to explore in detail here. 
What is important here and now is to recognize that this is where an important 
issue lies. 
Moving to convex sets of distributions i an improvement in several respects. 
First of all, we can show that such formalisms as Shafer's theory of belief 
functions can be represented within the theory of convex sets of classical 
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distributions as a special case (Kyburg [19]). Furthermore, since Shafer's 
representation is thereby shown to be a special case of the more general 
representation, we know that under certain circumstances we will be able to use 
Shafer's elegant and efficient updating algorithms to update our belief unctions. 
Roughly speaking, these circumstances are those under which we have reason to 
believe that certain possibilities are simply ruled out. (They are not, as is 
sometimes said, those in which we can accept probabilistic independence among 
certain variables.) In addition, our understanding of so-called causal relations 
will often provide the grounds for ruling out certain abstract possibilities. 
Second, if we want to use our degrees of belief as input to a decision process, 
we can be sure, if our beliefs are represented as convex sets of classical 
probabilities, that some decision procedure is not dominated. That is, it is 
possible to satisfy the principle of maximizing expected utility for some 
probability distribution that is consistent with what one has a right to claim to 
believe. 
POSSIBILITY THEORY 
According to this approach (Zadeh [20]), the higher order measure of 
uncertainty is radically different from the first-order measure of uncertainty. 
The first-order measure may concern standard probabilities, "linguistic" 
probabilities, or mere fuzziness, while the measure of uncertainty at the higher 
order need not in any way conform to the axioms of the probability calculus. 
It is possible to show that the intervals of Dempster and Shafer are in fact 
special cases of the possibility approach (Zadeh [21]). Furthermore, the 
possibility approach is far richer in structure than the interval approach just 
described. Unfortunately, it is still not clear whether this structure (which 
requires the structure of fuzzy set theory) can, or should, represent anything 
more than subjective opinion in the same way the subjective Bayesian view does. 
What is clear is that it does provide a richer structure than that provided by either 
sets of probabilities or the hulls of convex sets of probabilities. 
On the other hand, possibility theory does not embody additivity. This 
constitutes a prima facie argument against its usefulness in decision theory, in 
view of the Dutch book argument. This is a question that is being seriously 
addressed (Zadeh [22]). 
CONCLUSION 
The conclusion is that so-called second-order p obabilities have nothing to 
contribute conceptually to he analysis and representation f uncertainty. The 
same ends can be achieved more simply, and without he introduction of novel 
machinery, by combining "first' - and"second' '- order probabilities into a joint 
probability space, even if they are conceptually different kinds of probabilities. 
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In any concrete application, the conceptual differences will disappear, because 
that application requires a "single-case" probability. Peter Cheeseman's claim 
that "information about the accuracy of P is fully expressed by a probability 
density function over P"  [8, p. 1007] appears to be fully vindicated if we 
construe "over P"  to refer to a space in which all of our information can be 
expressed. 
We can have opinions about propensities or long-run frequencies; we can 
have opinions about the opinions of others. Our opinions in these cases, as in 
others, can be represented as degrees of belief. But in these cases there is 
nothing ambiguous about he objects of belief; they are what they are--states of 
affairs or psychological facts. We may represent these degrees of belief as 
belonging to different orders (and even prove interesting things about hem), but 
nothing in this procedure represents insecurity about one's own degrees of 
belief. 
The story about intervals is different. If the intervals are construed merely as a 
"broader" representation of belief, they are of less use epistemically, 
practically, and doxastically. They are just as subjective, just as awkward to 
evaluate, and of questionable descriptive significance. 
But if the intervals are construed as objectively determined by the evidence we 
have, the situation is very different. In terms of our original picture, what we see 
is that for practical purposes the usefulness of our measures of uncertainty gain 
an advantage by virtue of their objectivity. For epistemic purposes the 
objectively based interval measures are just as useful as point-valued measures. 
Doxastically--that is, as the basis for an elegant and simple theory of belief--the 
interval theory is nowhere near as interesting as the Bayesian theory. 
The upshot is that if you want a descriptive theory of uncertainty and are 
willing to pay the price of subjectivity, classical personalistic theory wins hands 
down. The primary function of such a theory must be taken to be doxastic and 
descriptive. One can introduce higher order probabilities, but they must always 
admit of representation in a higher-dimension version of the first-order theory. 
If you want an objective, normative theory, the interval approach answers to 
your needs. Although it does not lead to a nice doxastic theory, it does yield a 
plausible decision theory (though much more needs to be learned about such a 
decision theory) and functions well epistemically. However, this claim rests on 
the controversial c aim that statistical inference can be objective. 
At the next level of complexity, possibility/certainty theory offers a richer and 
more flexible background, but it is as yet unclear whether and how the contents 
of such a theory can be based on knowledge of objective facts about he world. 
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